Define the operating boundary
A useful definition names the triggering event, required inputs, governing source, accountable owner, decision or action, exception path, evidence retained, and downstream handoff. Buyers should adapt those elements to their own population, jurisdictions, policies, systems, and control model before writing requirements.
The most important distinction is between a label and an operational capability. A provider may document privileged access, credential, and identity governance while depending on customer-supplied policy, licensed content, third-party data, integration partners, manual review, or services. The demonstration should expose those dependencies rather than hiding them behind a completed interface.
What a demonstration should prove
- Begin with representative source records and a named policy, standard, or controlled rule.
- Show the normal path, an ambiguous case, missing data, an exception, an override, and a material source change.
- Identify who can change rules, who can approve or reject, and how accountability is preserved.
- Trace every output back to inputs, versions, timestamps, user actions, and governing evidence.
- Export the resulting record and reconcile it with downstream systems and retained obligations.
Authority and operating context
ISA/IEC 62443-2-1:2024
Part 2-1 defines security-program requirements for asset owners across governance, risk, implementation, maintenance, and continuous improvement of IACS security. It creates an owner-specific program lens that product capability lists cannot satisfy by themselves.
IEC PAS 62443-2-2:2025
The specification provides guidance for developing, validating, operating, and maintaining a set of technical, physical, and process security measures for IACS facilities. It focuses the buyer on a maintained protection scheme rather than an isolated product or control purchase.
ISA/IEC 62443-3-3
Part 3-3 defines system security requirements and security levels for industrial automation and control systems. It helps structure system-level requirements, but capability marketing and certification labels need exact scope, version, and scheme evidence.
IEC 62443-4-2
Part 4-2 defines technical security requirements for IACS components using the foundational requirements and security-level framework. Component claims should identify exact product, version, certification scheme, target level, and system dependency.
CISA CPGs
CISA publishes a prioritized set of cybersecurity practices intended to reduce common and consequential risks across critical-infrastructure sectors. The CPGs give buyers a risk-reduction lens for access, segmentation, backups, inventory, monitoring, incident response, and supplier decisions.
CISA Secure by Demand for OT
The guide presents security considerations and questions for OT buyers addressing product configuration, logging, identity, updates, vulnerability handling, support, and secure-by-design behavior. It turns cybersecurity into a procurement and lifecycle evidence decision rather than an after-deployment add-on.
CISA primary OT mitigations
The fact sheet calls attention to exposed OT connectivity and prioritizes defensive actions for owners and operators facing intentional targeting. It makes internet exposure, remote access, credentials, segmentation, inventory, logging, and recovery evidence central to product and architecture review.
TSA Pipeline-2021-02F
The directive continued performance-based requirements covering cyber risk assessment, plans, architecture, access, monitoring, incident response, testing, and related evidence for notified pipeline operators. The expired date and separate proposed-rule path make status verification essential; vendor pages must not present an old mapping as proof of current obligation or compliance.
C2M2 v2.1
C2M2 supports evaluation and improvement of cybersecurity capabilities across domains such as risk, assets, access, threat and vulnerability, situational awareness, response, continuity, third parties, workforce, architecture, and program management. It helps frame program and operating-capability evidence without turning a product feature into a maturity score.
Operating domains
Remote access, identity, and third-party control
The operating domain governing who can reach which industrial resource, for which approved task, through which path, with which credential, privilege, device, time window, supervision, file flow, emergency process, and retained session evidence.
Evidence and comparison limits
Official provider documentation can establish product positioning. Provider confirmation can clarify package or availability. Independent observation requires a disclosed scenario, environment, date, inputs, and reproducible result. None of those sources alone establishes buyer-specific legal, clinical, regulatory, quality, or operational fitness.
Buyer questions
- What exact outcome and evidence should privileged access, credential, and identity governance produce?
- Which source, version, and customer facts govern the workflow?
- Which decisions remain human and who is accountable for them?
- What is native, configured, integrated, service-delivered, or planned?
- How does a changed source affect open and historical records?
Recent changes
IEC publishes PAS 62443-1-6:2025 — IIoT reviews need explicit device, gateway, edge, cloud, identity, data, update, supplier, and owner responsibilities.
CISA partners publish primary mitigations for OT — Owners should review exposure, access, architecture, credentials, monitoring, and recovery through site-authorized engineering processes.
IEC publishes PAS 62443-2-2:2025 — Asset owners should evaluate technology as part of a maintained technical, physical, and process protection scheme.
CISA partners publish Secure by Demand for OT buyers — Security requirements and evidence should be negotiated before purchase and retained through acceptance, operation, support, and end of life.